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Abstract: Husserl rejects the contrast between 
human life as an irrational factum and reason 
as an objectifying force that is hostile to life. 
Hence he moves away from the incompatibility 
between philosophy as science and philosophy 
of life. This paper has two purposes. First, it 
attempts to analyze the sequence of living 
horizons of reason, i.e., to lay out a progressive 
bringing-into-play that begins in a primal histo-
ry linked to instinct, goes through history prop-
er with its manners of practical reason, and 
reaches its culmination in a second historicity 
with a teleological development. In his last 
dated manuscript, Husserl speaks of “the up-
right, fair reason of the natural, sound human 
understanding” that plays a role before “the 
scientific, philosophical reason” (Hua XXIX, 
386). Secondly, against this background, phe-
nomenology of reason is considered as a view 
that is grounded in passive fulfillments, traces 
theory back to life, and emphasizes the inter-
penetration of the various manifestations of 
reason. It is argued that the relationship be-
tween intention and fulfillment pervades the 
movement from latent to manifest reason, 
renders possible different modes of rational 
legitimation, and shows distinctive traits in each 
mode. With regard to the vitality of Husserlian 
reason, a brief epilogue for the Spanish speak-
ing world deals with some of J. Ortega y 
Gasset’s views on the issue. 
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Resumen: Husserl rechaza la contraposición 
entre la vida humana como un factum irracional 
y la razón como una fuerza objetivante hostil a 
la vida. Por eso se aparta de la incompatibilidad 
entre la filosofía como ciencia y la filosofía de la 
vida. Este trabajo tiene dos propósitos. Prime-
ro, intenta analizar la secuencia de horizontes 
vitales de la razón, es decir, desplegar una 
progresiva puesta-en-juego que se inicia en la 
protohistoria ligada al instinto, pasa a través de 
la historia en sentido propio con sus modalida-
des de razón práctica, y culmina en una segun-
da historicidad con un desarrollo teleológico. En 
su último manuscrito fechado, Husserl habla de 
“la proba y honrosa razón del entendimiento 
humano natural” que desempeña un papel con 
anterioridad a “la razón científica, la filosófica” 
(Hua XXIX, 386). En segundo lugar, frente a 
este trasfondo, se examina la fenomenología de 
la razón como una visión que se funda en cum-
plimientos pasivos, refiere la teoría a la vida, y 
pone énfasis en la compenetración de las varia-
das manifestaciones de la razón. Se sostiene 
que la relación entre intención y cumplimiento 
atraviesa el movimiento desde la razón latente 
a la razón patente, hace posible diversos modos 
de legitimación racional, y muestra rasgos 
distintivos en cada uno de los modos. Respecto 
de la vitalidad de la razón husserliana, un breve 
epílogo para hispanoparlantes considera algu-
nos puntos de vista de J. Ortega y Gasset sobre 
la cuestión. 
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In his article “Life and Knowledge” (1892/93), Wilhelm Dilthey distinguishes 
formal and material categories. The former are grounded on reason and refer to 
relations such as identity, equality, difference, and generality. These relations 
are characterized by their thorough transparent and univocal character. On the 
other hand, material categories are grounded on life, which cannot be under-
stood thoroughly by means of them1. This viewpoint is maintained by Dilthey 
until his final work, where he writes: “In every understanding of life there is 
something irrational, as life itself is […]. For the realm of conscious life emerges 
as an island out of unfathomable depths”2. Edmund Husserl’s concern has been 
precisely the rejection of the incompatibility between philosophy as a science 
and the philosophy of life: “Thus, the fundamental character of phenomenology 
is a scientific philosophy of life, […] a radical science that has universal concrete 
life and its lifeworld as an originary theme […]” (Hua XXXII, 241)3. My purpose 
is to show a progressive bringing-into-play of vital horizons in a development of 
rationality through history. The process attains its highest point in transcenden-
tal phenomenology and its concern with a “self-explication of life 
(Selbstauslegung des Lebens).” (Hua XXXII, 147) We shall see that the rela-
tionship between intention and fulfillment, which pervades the movement from 
latent to manifest reason, also renders possible different modes of patent ra-
tional legitimation. With regard to the vitality of reason, I add a brief epilogue 
for Spanish speaking people with a reference to José Ortega y Gasset.    
 
 
1. INSTINCTS AND PRIMAL HISTORICITY 
 
Husserl holds that active reason is contained already in a previous basis: 
“Passive motivation is the mother-ground (Muttergrund) of reason […]. Precise-
ly for this reason, it is a potential reason, for what the intellectus agens brings 
 
 
1  See Wilhelm Dilthey, Grundlegung der Wissenschaften vom Menschen, der Gesellschaft und der 
Geschichte, Gesammelte Schriften XIX (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1982), p. 361 f. 
2  Wilhelm Dilthey, Der Aufbau der geschichtlichen Welt in den Geisteswissenschaften, Gesammelte 
Schriften VII (Stuttgart/Göttingen; B. G. Teubner/Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 71979), p. 218 ff.  
3 Abbreviation, with indication of volume and page, for Edmund Husserl, Gesammelte Werke-Husserliana 
I-XL (Dordrecht: Springer [previously: Den Haag: Martinus Nijhoff; Dordrecht/ Boston/London: Kluwer 
Academic Publishers], 1950-2009. 
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forth is already located in the mother-ground.” (Hua XXXVII, 332) In an inquiry 
back into the sources of reason, one must consider first of all an instinctive in-
tentionality that involves an originary affection and so guides individual devel-
opment since its beginning. It works at the basis of the experience of nature, 
action in the world, and the relationship with others, and, thus, makes up a 
previous possession of the world that is presupposed by any further acquisition. 
Husserl compares “the problem of the instincts” with the “problem of hidden 
reason.” (Hua VI, 53) He refers to the “inborn primal being, the primal predis-
position of the ego presupposed by all constitution,” contends that the consti-
tuted world and the universe of rationality are enclosed within it, and goes on 
to state: “Thus, the inborn predisposition of subjectivity is the irrational that 
makes possible rationality, or has its rationality in being the ‘teleological 
ground’ for all the rational”4.   
Primal experience is conditioned in all its moments by instincts and is made 
up by an alien hyletic core and, on the egoical side, by both feelings that 
prompt or hinder hyletic manifestations, and kinestheses that motivate the con-
stitution of optimal data and through them the experience of objects. Feelings 
and kinestheses remain, along with hyletic data, in the higher levels of consti-
tution. Husserl holds that “up to objectivation (enworlding) they constantly play 
their role or rather always receive new roles, higher roles, they acquire higher 
functional structures”5. The revealing force of feeling allows Husserl to state 
that “mere sensations and, in a higher level, sensible objects, as things that are 
there for the subject, but are there ‘value free’ are abstractions”6. With this the 
ultimate genetic ground is laid for a phenomenology of reason in which no dif-
ferentiation of theoretical, affective, or practical reason is allowed. 
 
 
4 „Dieses eingeborene Urwesen, die Uranlage des Ich vorausgesetzt für alle Konstitution. In ihr statisch 
und ‚genetisch‘ geschlossen ist die konstituierte Welt in ihr Wesensformen, bzw. das Universum der 
Rationalität. So ist die eingeborene Anlage der Subjektivität das Irrationale, das Rationalität möglich 
macht, oder es hat seine Rationalität darin, der ‚teleologische Grund‘ für alles Rationale zu sein.“ (Ms E 
III 9, 4b) Quoted by James R. Mensch, Husserl’s Account of Our Consciousness of Time (Milwaukee: 
Marquette University Press, 2010), p. 257.  
5 „[…] bis hinauf zur Objektivierung (Verweltlichung) spielen diese Momente beständig ihre Rolle, oder 
vielmehr, sie erhalten immer neue, höhere Rollen, sie bekommen immer höhere Funktionsgestalten.“ 
(Ms B III 9, 79b) I wish to thank Prof. Dr. Ullrich Melle, Director of the Husserl Archives in Leuven, for 
permission to quote from Husserl’s unpublished writings. 
6  „Alles Leben ist unaufhörliches Streben, alle Befriedigung ist Durchgangsbefriedigung. Bloße 
Empfindungsdaten und in höherer Stufe sinnliche Gegenstände, wie Dinge, die für das Subjekt da sind, 
aber ‚wertfrei‘ da sind, sind Abstraktionen. Es kann nichts geben, was nicht das Gemüt berührt, und das 
Gleichgültige ist nun ein Zwischenstadium zwischen Lust und Unlust […].“ (Ms A VI 26, 42a) 
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What is significant for the development of reason is a movement of empty 
intention and fulfillment that is directly connected with instincts and bears in 
itself a teleology. A vague, empty horizon of blind intentions strives for satisfac-
tion, has its outcome in bodily movements, and can be fulfilled or disappointed. 
First tied to nondisclosed instinctive goals, the instinctive horizon gradually 
gains determination. Insofar as they turn out in bodily movements, instincts 
imply a practical-kinesthetic horizon that enables us to enter into a relationship 
with the surrounding world. We learn to be the owners of our living bodies and 
in this way attain an understanding of ourselves as organized systems of pre-
dispositions for movements that can be governed and trace the outline of our 
world. In this connection it is worth observing that Ludwig Landgrebe has re-
ferred to an immanent reason that has its roots in the most basic actions that 
can be accomplished7.  
Whereas nonobjectifying instincts are directed toward specific contents, the 
objectifying instinct only requires the fusion of hyletic contents, whatever may 
be their kind, in a harmony that leads to the prominence of a material unity. 
Syntheses of association spring from it and unify contents enabling them to 
emerge as affecting data. This apprehension of unities within multiplicities, i.e., 
of unities that stand out against varying hyletic affections lays in turn the 
ground for harmony as a distinctive trait of reason. What Husserl is interested 
in showing is that “in the child of the first period of childhood we already have 
instinctive intentionality, before an intentionality of interests, with reference to 
being in a proper and full sense” (HuaM VIII, 75)8. 
Instincts give direction to our primal goals in the field of self-preservation 
and of our relationship with others: “In his primal instinct, each individual sub-
ject […] carries ‘implicitly’ all the others that can present themselves to him, 
and all their achievements, all the world as humanized, as cultural world”9. The 
linking function of instinct brings about a primal generativity as the basis on 
which the different individual life-streams are sustained. Essential to it is a 
 
 
7 “If one understands reason as the higher principle of any establishment of meaning, one can say that 
this spontaneity of bodily self-movement has its own immanent reason.” (Ludwig Landgrebe, 
“Phänomenolo-gische Analyse und Dialektik,” Phänomenologische Forschungen, Nº 10, 1980, p. 74) 
8 See Nam-in Lee, Edmund Husserls Phänomenologie der Instinkte, Phaenomenologica 128 (Dordrecht/ 
Boston/London: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1993), pp. 107 ff, 186 ff.  
9 „In seinem Urinstinkt trägt jedes einzelne Subjekt […] ‚implizite‘ alle andere, die ihm entgegentreten 
können, und alle ihre Leistungen, die gesamte Welt als humanisierte, als Kulturwelt in sich.“ (Ms A VI 
34, 37a) 
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“love-impulse (Liebestrieb)” and a “care of life (Lebenssorge)”10  directed at 
children and parents. A horizon of generativity is sustained in our homeworld 
because we know ourselves as the actually living members of a chain of gener-
ations. Children grow within a family tradition and adopt through imitation and 
instruction the typical structures of mature beings, which become a means for 
the transmission of a wider communitarian historical development. They devel-
op an interest in why thing are as they are, and questions about these motives 
are the originary questions that can be raised with regard to history. Husserl 
refers to a primal history (Urgeschichte) that revolves around the motives and 
purposes of objects and actions. So it is, then, that, surrounded by fellow hu-
man beings that set themselves ends, a child “learns to understand,” we are 
told, “their purposeful action as such, and to understand objects that have a 
purpose (Zweckobjekte) not only as objects of usage (Gebrauchsobjekte), but 
as objects that have come into being teleologically (primal history)” (Hua XV, 
420). 
Husserl speaks of a “primal form of historicity (Urform der 
Gechichtlichkeit)” that affords a “basis for every higher historicity (Unterlage für 
jede höhere Geschichtlichkeit)”11 . The counterpart of this development is a 
“breakdown of the lower reason (Zusammenbruch der niederen Vernunft)” that 
must blaze the trail for higher modes “as an inversion of originary instincts”12.   
 
     
2. FIRST AND SECOND HISTORICITY 
 
On the ground of the chain of generations, the establishment of enduring 
and encompassing ends brings forward a higher-order spiritual generativity that 
takes on― in new forms tied to these goals―the protentional thrust pertaining 
to the universal instinctive intentionality. This “first historicity (erste 
Historizität)” is the field in which “reason in the first sense (Vernunft im ersten 
Sinne)” (Hua XXIX, 40) can evolve. A new stage in the fulfillment of empty in-
 
 
10 Ms E III 4, 5b, 9b .  
11 Ms K III 3, 50 a. See Edmund Husserl, “Grundlegende Untersuchungen zum phänomenologischen 
Ursprung der Räumlichkeit der Natur,” in Marvin Farber (ed.), Philosophical Essays in Memory of Edmund 
Husserl (Cambridge [Massachusetts]: Harvard University Press, 1940),  p. 319. 
12  „[…] schon vor der Wissenschaft ist konkrete Vernunft und selbst absolut gerichtete da als 
Umwendung ursprünglicher Instinkte.“ (Ms E III 4, 16 b) Quoted by J. R. Mensch, op. cit., p. 257. 
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tentions comes forth and is superimposed on the sheer lapsing of generations. 
In a note to his last dated manuscript (June/July 1937), Husserl offers the fol-
lowing characterizations of this mode of reason: “Reason −in the sense here 
presented− establishes in fact the separation from animals, and also from ani-
mals that zoologically are already called human beings, namely, prehistorical 
human beings that have not yet acquired the capacity of being able to be free, 
of being able to reflect and with this to know (as a human capacity, a well-
exercised ability that further trains itself in ever higher levels).” (Hua XXIX, 384 
n.) Conscious life is orientated toward coherence first in an instinctive manner, 
and then through the striving for an active coincidence that expresses a deci-
sion of the will. A rational praxis emerges through the deliberation on practical 
possibilities and impossibilities, the care for self-preservation, the regulation of 
communal life, and the practices of functionaries that deal with these problems. 
This means that “the human being of everyday life is after all not without rea-
son,” and that in this condition he reflects on ends and means, generates 
methods, and attains results that “can always be understood again in their ra-
tionality” (Hua VI, 270, 337). Here one must take into account particular modes 
of fulfillment, verification, and truth.   
The surrounding world is experienced according to what is relevant to our 
practical purposes in such a way that we have our “ontic certainties and 
nontheoretical, nonlogical interests in verification.” (Hua XXXIX, 201) Accom-
plishments have their truth when they are fit to an end and achieve it. Husserl 
stresses that a successful praxis presupposes the constitution of a stable expe-
riential world to which it adapts itself: “I have a possible ‘rational’-praxis only if 
I have a world of known things at my disposal.” (Hua XXXIX, 150; see 406) On 
the other hand, experience is a mode of praxis. Even if it alters nothing in an 
object, experience is reflected in the bestowal of an ever richer experiential 
meaning on it (see Hua XXXIX, 278). Furthermore, apperception is not limited 
to experience, but is found also in praxis. Practical apperceptions emerge from 
previous praxis and anticipate possible future action through a transference 
that has a bearing on ends, means, procedures, and so forth. In the same 
manner as perception, practical life is guided by analogies. These can be cor-
roborated and lead to an ever more firm analogy. With regard to the confirma-
tion and disconfirmation of apperceptive anticipations, Husserl refers to practi-
cal reason within a world of praxis: “This world has its legitimacy of being 
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(Seinsrecht), and acting within the world has its practical reason in itself, which 
corroborates itself in general in itself, and also disproves itself in singular 
items.” (Hua XXXIX, 418; see 857)  
As he refers to a “care of life (Lebenssorge)” or a “care of existence 
(Existenzsorge)” concerned with “how (Wie)” life develops, Husserl describes a 
practical modalization. By way of example: when he is threatened by bankrupt-
cy, a merchant can consider and weigh new forms of life or professional activi-
ties according to the horizon of his capacities. His concern is reflected in a hope 
that is centered in certain possibilities that are subject to confirmation and dis-
confirmation. A coincidence with what is expected amounts to success, whereas 
discordance amounts to failure. The process is subject to corrections in the 
same way as the progress of perception can restore certainty or fall into a re-
futing canceling-out. In more general terms, care encompasses our whole life: 
“‘Care’ is in general an expression that, in its meaning, points in advance to the 
whole of life”13. Husserl adds that this teleological tendency implies a future 
horizon in which the possibility of the fulfillment of ends goes together with 
possibility of a deception: “Care is a mode of feeling that arises from the 
modalization of activity and from the constant predelineation of the horizon of 
possible failure, within which the courses of foreseeable and true success, of 
success subject to correction, are carried on”14.   
In the realm of moral practices, Husserl distinguishes the first stage of cus-
tom (Sitte) as a habitual behavior that lacks valuation and the second stage of 
morality (Sittlichkeit) as a behavior that includes valuation through external 
criteria and evokes the notion of practical reason highlighted by Paul Ricoeur as 
wisdom acquired in order to regulate the interaction between human beings. 
Both levels are contrasted to the autonomy of an inner determination that is 
tied to insights of reason and appears in a further stage15. About this we will 
have more to say later. 
Beyond the relativity of doxic modalization, which varies according to expe-
riential coherence, Husserl calls attention to the relativity pertaining to the al-
 
 
13 „‚Sorge‘ ist überhaupt ein Ausdruck, der in seinem Sinn vordeutet auf das Ganze des Lebens.“ (Ms A 
VI 34, 22b) 
14 „Die Sorge ist der Gefühlsmodus, der aus der Modalisierung der Aktivität entspringt und aus der 
beständigen Vorzeichnung des Horizontes möglichen Misslingens, innerhalb dessen die Linien des doch 
voraussichtlichen und gewissen Gelingens, des Gelingens unter Korrektur, verlaufen.“ (Ms E III 6, 3a) 
15 See Ms F I 24, 54a-56b. 
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teration of situations. To the open possibility that, in connection with the hori-
zon of extension of experience, the certainty of an object may turn into doubt 
or negation, is added the relativity associated with a horizon of anticipation of 
experience, i.e., the multifarious situations or surrounding worlds within which 
our experience takes place. Intuitive truths are relative to everyday life in 
communities or human activities whose practical projects determine their 
meaning and the required degree of assurance. Still far from universality and 
objectivity, truth pertains to everydayness in the manner of singularity and rel-
ativity because an object, although it remains identical, “transforms its being-
meaning, the meaning determined by the situation, so that, with the change of 
the situation, truths become other truths.” (Hua XXXIX, 192) Husserl stresses a 
condition of equivalence for all these horizons of anticipation: “Every truth re-
fers to its situation, and this change does not have the title ‘falsehood of what a 
moment ago was assured as true’ but rather the title truth as truth of the new 
situation.” (ib.)  A prescientific knowledge conditioned by situation and tradition 
enables us to know “how to decide rationally, with regard to each truth and 
falsehood, which are the grounds and differences that are relevant or irrelevant 
for it” (Hua XXIX, 385 f.). Husserl deals here with what Heinrich Rombach calls 
the multiveracity or plurality of reason, and Bernhard Waldenfels doxa as a 
third mode of episteme that is contained in the different world-orders that ex-
clude each other.  
Nevertheless, for Husserl, a universe of being transcends the relativity of 
the horizons of anticipation and subsists identically through all situations. In his 
last dated manuscript, Husserl attempts to show that the task assigned to phi-
losophy is that of being “in a peculiar combat-position against any and every 
other knowledge that remains in the pre- and extrascientific world-life.” (Hua 
XXIX, 377) In the motivation of this development, a decisive role is played by 
the awareness of the relativity associated with the differences between tradi-
tionally valid truths within various communities. Beyond the differences be-
tween what is one’s own and what belongs to others, a world-core can be high-
lighted as an identity that is interpreted in different manners. One could think, 
Husserl suggests, that this identification first appears in the mutual dealings of 
individuals or of different strata within a community. Nevertheless, in these 
cases there is a leveling out of contrasts by way of a reciprocal adjustment. It is 
precisely this normality that is affected when the vital space of a community is 
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surpassed in order to enter into another particular world: “With this,” claims 
Husserl, “the natural concept of reason is displaced: out of the upright, fair rea-
son of the natural, sound human understanding there comes now into being the 
scientific, philosophical reason.” (Hua XXIX, 386)  Accordingly, a new form of 
communalization that rightfully includes all human beings comes forth with phi-
losophy and science. This emergence is identified with the origin of a “second 
historicity (zweite Historizität).” (Hua XXIX, 41) A universal or rational 
generativity contrasts with the limitations of previous generativities because it 
is characterized by “the infinite movement from latent to manifest reason” with 
“the different stages of the movement of intention and fulfillment.” (Hua VI, 13, 
273) With this revolution, the prescientific notions that are taken for granted as 
regards the possibility of verification are transferred to the new realm in order 
to make another start. The fact that, in the prephilosophical surrounding world, 
everything is known as actually existing with its own truth, affords a rational 
ground for the building-up of philosophy and science.  
 
 
3. PHENOMENOLOGY OF REASON 
 
A “progressive bringing-into-play (progressives In-Spiel-setzen)” (HuaM 
VIII, 187) enables us to see how various manifestations of reason follow one 
another in a hierarchical structure. We have moved from the level of instinctive 
strivings, through more articulated modes linked to practical life, into a forceful 
manifestation in the history of philosophy and science. On this basis, transcen-
dental phenomenology adopts the primal establishments of philosophical rea-
son, i.e., the Greek primal establishment of universal knowledge and its infinite 
tasks and the Cartesian primal establishment of the requirement of apodicticity. 
Its inquiry discloses the moments of reason that were functioning implicitly, 
shows the conditions of possibility of reason, and clarifies the goals of a rational 
humanity. Having this in mind, Husserl writes: “Reason must already exist and 
must be able to bring itself to logical disclosure in the rational subject”16. In 
contrast to the previous activity of reason, which builds upon a credulous tak-
 
 
16  „Es muss Vernunft schon sein und muss sich zur logischen Selbstenthüllung in der vernünftigen 
Subjekt bringen können.“ (Ms E III 4, 19a) Quoted by J. R. Mensch, op. cit., p. 257 s. 
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en-for-grantedness, phenomenology is called to develop “the total theory of 
reason,” which through absolute responsibility and full self-justification must 
“raise us above the level of the naïve reason.” (Hua XXXV, 42) This higher posi-
tion sheds light on the previous instinctive, practical and theoretical stages, and 
effects a self-explication that is deeply rooted in life because it grounds the le-
gitimation of reason on previous modes of verification, and the interlacing of “a 
unique reason with its essential sides” (Hua XXVIII, 228) on the interweaving of 
the hyletic core, feeling, and kinestheses at the instinctive level.  
Husserl refers the phenomenological “critique of reason” back to “the clari-
fication of evidence and all the pertinent relationships between mere ‘intention’ 
and ‘fulfillment’ […].” (Hua XVII, 120) As we have seen, these relationships al-
ready belong to the previous stages of reason. Now the nature and unity of 
reason becomes manifest through an analysis of the legitimation they provide 
when harmony is attained, and of their link both with regulating a priori struc-
tures and horizons of possible development. This is the invariant core of reason 
as contradistinguished to its manifold manifestations. Transcendental phenom-
enology shows reason as a development of evidence without the accidental 
characters that the latter can show at first. Reason is grounded not so much on 
a single experience or action as on a harmonious synthesis in the fulfillment of 
the corresponding horizon-consciousness. It is endowed with more weight due 
to the forcefulness of evidences that reciprocally corroborate themselves. Evi-
dence and truth, as well as reason and verified actuality, are pairs of correlative 
concepts within the noetic-noematic parallelism. Actuality legitimates itself and 
shows itself as truth to rational consciousness, and, conversely, rational con-
sciousness effects a bestowal or dictation of legitimacy (Rechtgebung, 
Rechtsprechung) as regards actuality. Thus, for transcendental phenomenolo-
gy, consciousness is autonomous because the validity or nonvalidity of its posit-
ing is legitimated by its own means within the absolute self-sufficiency of the 
correlation between the world and world-consciousness. 
Due to its openness and its undetermined structure, horizon-intentionality 
both renders possible the synthetic harmony on which rationality is grounded 
and sets limits to an absolute rationality. As this process can take place in an 
individual life-flow alone, there is an ego-centeredness in which each subject is 
the point around which legitimation revolves. Furthermore, by virtue of its inde-
termination, horizonality situates the life of each ego under its rule and respon-
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sibility. For new intentions emerge over and over again enabling a new view-
point under which life can be assembled and interpreted. Thus, the subject 
shows himself as a center of spontaneity: “Only by its own freedom can a hu-
man being come to reason […]” (Hua XXVII, 42 s.)17. It is because indetermina-
tion motivates an endeavor toward completion that it places the subject in the 
midst of teleology. Finally, by its structure of determination, horizonality turns 
each subject into a center of apperceptive anticipation that adopts a heritage of 
meaning and as a result traces out courses for potential legitimation. In sum: 
reason is characterized by harmony in the fulfillment of empty intentions, the 
responsible role played by the subject in a teleological process, and the increas-
ing acquisitions that result from this process. This is the invariant that repeats 
itself and differentiates itself in specific domains of reason. 
Now I would like to draw attention to two points that clarify the vital char-
acter of rational legitimation. One concerns its grounds in passive syntheses 
and the other the nature of the a priori universalities by which it is ruled18.    
To find the groundwork for rational legitimation, we must turn to Husserl’s 
phenomenology of internal time-consciousness and consider originality not in 
connection with the beginning of the genesis of the ego as in our previous ref-
erence to instincts, but rather in connection with an inquiry back from the con-
stituted world into the ultimate constitutive functions in the living present (see 
HuaM VIII, 279). A threefold foundation must be emphasized. It concerns the 
movement of intention and fulfillment, the constitution of noematic unities, and 
the positing that can be referred to the noematic unities on the basis of fulfill-
ment.  
 
 
17 Javier San Martín deals with the problem of free reason by offering an analysis of the structure, the 
function, and the principle of phenomenology. The structure, which amounts to the correlation between 
the world and world-consciousness and to its a priori conceived as the core of a theory of strong ration-
ality, accomplishes a function that has to do with the requirements of rational life. The principle accord-
ing to which the function effects the structure is that we are not the outcome of the world but rather the 
true originary locus of meaning: “If we are convinced of this and attempt to shape our life, our culture, 
and our political life out of free reason, I believe that Husserl’s thought will still be an active force among 
us.” (La fenomenología como teoría de una racionalidad fuerte. Estructura y función de la fenomenología 
y otros ensayos [Madrid: UNED, 1994], p. 163) 
18 Miguel García-Baró examines these two points. On the one hand, he highlights a second level that 
deals not so much with the performances of constitution as with the “originary evident conditions” of 
transcendental constitution. These second-order problems concern temporality, intersubjectivity, 
bodylihood, and the ego, and “affect in an equal manner all forms of reason.” On the other hand, with 
regard to “the regionalized and concrete phenomenology of reason,” García-Baró stresses Husserl’s 
“keen perception of the teleological problem of transcendental constitution” and refers it back to “the 
insatiable theoretical and practical interest that is raised by the constituted unities and keeps transcen-
dental life in the balance.” (Vida y mundo. La práctica de la fenomenología [Madrid: Trotta, 1999], pp. 
234, 238)  
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The Bernau Manuscripts offer an analysis of the first two themes. The pri-
mordial time-flow is examined as an intermingling of retention and protention 
within a fulfillment process. The fulfillment of a previous protention must go 
retentionally into the following phases of consciousness, and, motivated by the 
continuum of preceding retentions, new protentions emerge directed toward 
future fulfillments, which, in being fulfilled, both become conscious again in the 
mode of a retention and arouse new protentions: “It belongs to the essence of 
this consciousness that it can constantly be fulfilled, so that each fulfillment is 
at the same time an intention for a new fulfillment, and so forth.” (Hua XXXIII, 
24) In this primordial process of general fulfillment there is a culmination point, 
which is the maximum point of fullness and the point of minimal emptying. A 
general fulfillment plays a role in the self-constitution of the primordial time-
process and, as contradistinguished to “all other levels of noemas,” brings forth 
“ultimate noematic formations.” (Hua XXXIII, 163) These formations are time-
moments that lay the framework for the constitution of immanent temporal 
objects through particular fulfillment. They have their own correlative noetic 
functions in the intentions of the primordial time-process, and Husserl speaks of 
a “reshaping of the concept of hyletic datum” (Hua XXXIII, 161 n.) with the 
purpose of showing only its time-features. On this basis there arise hyletic data 
that, along with noematic time-moments, also include sensuous contents. The 
noematic levels lead to the constitution of external objects that incorporate an 
apprehension of the sensuous contents.     
As regards positionality, Husserl shows that there is a positing pertaining to 
the consciousness of inner time insofar as our lived experiences can show 
themselves in the flow as internally and actually posited. He draws the distinc-
tion between a first and second belief. Whereas the second belief pertains to 
our acts or judgments and has as its correlates actualities of the external world, 
the first belief is a part of internal consciousness: “Its correlate is the charac-
teristic of actuality belonging to every lived-experience” (Hua XXIII, 338 n.; see 
424, 469, 588)19. 
A second aspect under which to consider the vitality of theoretical reason 
lies in the nature of the a priori that rules the teleological process of legitima-
 
 
19 John B. Brough, “Notes on the Absolute Time-Constitution Flow of Consciousness,” in Dieter Lohmar 
and Ichigiro Yamaguchi (eds.), On Time – New Contributions to the Husserlian Phenomenology of Time, 
Phaenomenologica 197 (Dordrecht: Springer, 2010), p. 36 s. 
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tion. Bearing in mind that the intellectual seeing of an essence “is, in the high-
est sense, an act of ‘reason’,” (Hua III/1, 317) let us point out some significant 
characters of the eidos that make the distinction between abstract and concrete 
become weaker and eventually disappear. First, although the apodictic positing 
of the existence of transcendental life as the first truth cannot be canceled out, 
the movement of intention, confirmation, and cancelation remains valid for the 
factual contents that go hand in hand with it. Second, the relationship between 
the essence of the transcendental ego and its factualness is unique. After stat-
ing that I exist with apodictic necessity and also have as a concrete life-stream 
my apodictic essence, Husserl goes on to make clear that “it is not as if my fac-
tualness were now something contingent […]”20. The reason for this is that, if it 
is to examine its essence or any other essence, transcendental subjectivity 
must necessarily exist. In this manner it becomes clear that its essence cannot 
be considered as a mere possibility like the essence of a triangle. Third, the 
material a priori is contingent because it is concerned with the hyletic side of 
subjectivity. This is the contingency of a reason that is only pure in the sense 
that it does not require a specific type of sensibility, but is referred to a subject 
that is endowed necessarily with sensibility. Husserl contrasts the contingent a 
priori of the hyletic essences with the formal a priori of pure reason that is 
above material determination (see Hua XVII, 33 f.). Fourth, essences move 
away from a closed ideality because a horizon always remains open for further 
eidetic determinations. Even if what has been attained cannot be canceled out, 
empty intentions can be fulfilled in a process of specification (see Hua XXV, 
247). Thus general essences establish a rule, but do not close down possibilities 
for subjectivity. They determine a “what” that does not provide a complete and 
thorough outline for our performances. In other words, general essences are 
included in factual actualizations, but the “how” of the actualizations is not re-
ducible to them. Consequently, Husserl can come to speak of eidetic singulari-
ties, which are universals with no particular cases that serve as examples by 
adding their own factual determinations. Eidetic singularities have no extension 
in contrast to all other essences. They included the eidos of each transcenden-
 
 
20  „Ich bin in apodiktischer Notwendigkeit, nicht als leerer Ichpol, sondern in meinem konkreten Leben 
mit all dem, was damit untrennbar eins ist. Al das habe ich mein Wesen. Aber nicht ist es so, als ob 
meine Tatsächlichkeit nun ein Zufälliges wäre, als ob mein apodiktisch einsehbares allgemeines Wesen 
voranginge in dem Sinn, wie wir es sonst im Verhältnis von apodiktischen Wesensallgemeinheiten und 
darunter Fallenden Fakten kennen.“ (Ms E III 9, 7b) See Hua XV, 385, 403. 
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tal subjectivity as a unique singular entity or a concretum in which the essential 
and the factual only differ because the essential contents that make up a So-
sein are apprehended apart from actual existence21. Husserl refers to an “indi-
vidual essence (individuelles Wesen),” (Hua III/2, 487) and holds that “every 
lived-experience belonging to the stream […] has an essence of its own which 
can be seized upon intuitively, a ‘content’ which allows of being considered by 
itself in its ownness.” (Hua III/1, 70; see 35)   
 
   
4. AXIOLOGICAL AND PRACTICAL REASON 
 
The axiological and practical side of reason stresses the vital characters of 
reason by pointing out ultimate ends associated, along with a community of 
truth, with a community of love in the framework of a teleology that guides 
human life. Husserl speaks of an “emotional evidence (Gemütsevidenz)” with 
regard to an “emotional and volitional meaning of the world (Gemüts- und 
Willenssinn der Welt),” so that “emotion and will are a peculiar source of the 
legitimate and genuine”22. It should be recalled that doxic acts are themselves 
practical acts that have truth as a goal of the will, the value of which is appre-
hended through feeling. As was mentioned, due to the disclosing role of feeling, 
Husserl can contend that there are no value-free objects. 
Husserl characterizes love as “one of the basic problems of phenomenolo-
gy”23, and the criticism has been leveled that he does not offer an explicit and 
systematic reflection on the relationship between truth and love24. Neverthe-
less, it can be argued that the precise point of contact between the two can be 
seen in the movement of intention to fulfillment and the subsequent possibility 
of confirmation and disconfirmation within the general framework provided by a 
horizon. This bridge concerns the harmony that can be attained both in the 
horizon of experience and the horizon of action. Husserl holds that the world 
 
 
21 This point is strongly made by J. N. Mohanty. See Phenomenology. Between Essentialism and Tran-
scendental Philosophy (Evanston [Illinois]: Northwestern University, 1997), pp. 3-7; and The Philosophy 
of Edmund Husserl. A Historical Development (New Haven & London: Yale University Press, 2008), p. 
329-333. 
22 „Die Gemüt und der Wille ist eine eigene Quelle des Rechten und Echten […].“ (Ms A V 21, 127b) 
23 „Liebe im echten Sinn ist eine der Hauptprobleme der Phänomenologie, […].“ (Ms E III 2, 36b) 
24 See Ulrich Melle, “Edmund Husserl: From Reason to Love,” in J. J. Drummond and L. Embree (eds.), 
Phenomenological Approaches to Moral Philosophy, Phaenomenologica 47 (Dordrecht/Boston/London: 
Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2002), p. 247. 
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“not only fulfills theoretical conditions of possibility for harmonious being, but 
also conditions of possibility for harmonious valuable being and for harmonious 
being as a field of human rational praxis”25. This establishes a solid connection 
between doxic reason and axiological-practical reason. Just as the world of ex-
perience is posited as actual because discrepancies are resolved in a higher-
level unity, the actual world of valuation and praxis is the correlate of the unity 
of a volitional validity. This practical validity intends a complex of goals that 
outline the living future horizon of the totality of our life. Thus a rational subject 
should anticipate his whole life according to previous decisions taken with re-
gard to the shaping of a vital horizon, and also be conscious of coincidences, 
modalizations, and cancelations in the fulfillment of the empty intentions. Con-
sciousness of a discordance can assume the form of shame and repentance that 
lead to a reestablishment of the canceled validity or of retroactive motivation 
that brings forth a new validity correcting the previous one: “The final goal of 
the individual is a full harmony with himself and a full freedom from all drives 
that do not lie in the direction of rational self-legislation”26.  
Harmony is achieved through a sequence of levels that include i) ethical 
consciousness (ethisches Gewissen) as the possibility of guiding our life before-
hand so that our acts are not justified subsequently and by chance, ii) rational 
disposition (Gesinnung der Vernunft) as a habituality or life-style that compris-
es all our acts, iii) self-contentment (Selbstzufriedenheit) as the outcome of the 
constant manifestation of the disposition in justified ethical behavior, and iv) 
happiness (Glückseligkeit) as the additional satisfaction with our abilities and 
the surrounding world, i.e., the finishing touch of what is not only good but also 
successful27. Furthermore, Husserl stresses the intersubjective side of happi-
ness, and refers to a “rational-ethic community” in the following way: “One can 
be completely happy,” he claims, “only if humanity as a whole can be happy. 
Life deserves to be lived […] with a superior right when in my acting I see the 
open horizon of a social bond of love and a working-community in which all of 
 
 
25 Edmund Husserl, „Wert des Lebens. Wert der Welt. Sittlichkeit (Tugend) und Glückseligkeit,“ Husserl 
Studies 13, Nº 3, 1997, p. 233.  
26 „Das letzte Ziel des Individuums ist, völlige Einstimmigkeit mit sich selbst und völlige Freiheit von 
allen Antrieben, welche nicht in der Richtung einer vernünftigen Selbstgesetztgebung liegen.“ (Ms F I 24, 
47b) See Ms A V 22, 3a-4b. On the role of decision in the harmonious building-up of one’s own being, 
see Urbano Ferrer Santos, La trayectoria fenomenológica de Husserl (Pamplona: EUNSA, 2008), pp. 
230-236. 
27 See Roberto J. Walton, “La razón práctica como saber y como crítica,” Anuario Colombiano de   Feno-
menología, Vol. IV (Popayán: Universidad de Cauca, 2010), pp. 221-242. 
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us advance in the average and can help ourselves in raising the level of our 
existence”28.  The intersubjective side of happiness will lead us to see the dis-
tinctive trait of axiological-practical reason in a displacement to otherness with-
in the encompassing striving for harmony.   
Husserl states that love “has horizons, horizons of fulfillment and cancela-
tion”29. In fulfillment, the outcome of love is accordance: “Loving, to be one 
with the loved, to ‘coincide,’ to ‘merge,’ in one’s own being with the loved being 
in a pure harmony, in a dual-unity”30. This accordance differs from the harmony 
that legitimates an object in the realm of doxic reason. According to Husserl, 
phenomenology “shows how, in the genuine love of neighbor, the other is not 
thematic as an object in the world, as something real, but rather exists as a 
counter-ego, and shows how in love a personal, i.e., permanent unification 
takes place, […]”31. Along with accordance, horizonality implies the collapse of 
one’s own ego in the other ego, and Husserl stresses the scope and perma-
nence of the horizon as the distinctive traits of true love: “Love is an outstand-
ing sense,” he writes, “is a personal being-one-with-another and living-one-
with-another with the horizon of the whole life. It is not merely to be and to live 
as an individual ego, and only occasionally to go along co-living with another, 
but rather at the same time in one’s own being to be in the other and to sustain 
oneself in the other, and this in a fully concrete manner”32. The community of 
love between the ego and the alter ego entails a reciprocal movement in which 
the striving of one enters for ever in the striving of the other. The other is per-
 
 
28 E. Husserl, „Wert des Lebens,“ p. 233.  
29  „In mir selbst Urakte der Liebe, die als Liebe Horizonte hat, Horizonte der Erfüllung und der 
Durchstreichung.“ (Ms E III 2, 40b) 
30  „Liebend mit dem Geliebten eins sein, sich im eigenen Sein mit dem geliebten Sein ‚decken,‘ 
verschmelzen, zu einer reinen Harmonie, zu einer Zweieinigkeit.“ (Ms E III 2, 39 b) 
31 „Sie [die Phänomenologie] weist auf, wie in der echten Nächstenliebe nicht der Andere als Weltobjekt, 
als Reales, thematisch ist, sondern der Andere als Gegen-Ich, und wie in der Liebe transzendentale 
personale, d.i. bleibende Einigung statthat, […].“ (Ms E III 4, 10b) Husserl refers to the condition of 
cosubjects of the others: “But they are also for me cosubjects as subjects in the field of my ethical solici-
tude, their true welfare concerns me, and mine conversely concerns them […]”:„Aber sie sind auch für 
mich Mitsubjekte als Subjekte in meinen ethischen Fürsorgefeld, ihr wahres Wohl und Wehe geht mich 
selbst an, und meines […] umgekehrt sie an.“ (Ms E III 4, 15a) 
32 „Liebe im ausgezeichneten Sinn ist ein personales Miteinander-Sein und Miteinander-Leben mit dem 
Horizont des gesamten Lebens. Es ist nicht bloß als Einzel-Ich Sein und Leben und nur gelegentlich auf 
einen Anderen mitlebend Eingehen, sondern in seinem eigenen Sein zugleich im Anderen Sein und den 
Anderen in sich Tragen, und das völlig konkret.“ (Ms E III 8, 8b) On the unified life of subjects and iden-
tification in feeling and will, Husserl writes: “Love looks out into the loved and in such a way that I, the 
lover, reach round in my love the being of the other, and do so concretely as being in his life, and he 
himself concretely with my actual current life, but I reach round in a unity, in a ‘harmony’”: „Liebe geht 
auf dem Geliebten und so, dass ich, der Liebende, in meinem Lieben das Sein des Anderen, und zwar 
konkret als Sein in seinem Leben, umspanne und ihn selbst konkret mit meinem jeweiligen Leben, aber 
umspanne in einer Einigkeit, in einer ‚Harmonie‘.“ (Ms E III 2, 40a) 
REASON AND ITS LIVING HORIZONS IN EDMUND HUSSERL’S PHENOMENOLOGY 415 
 
Investigaciones Fenomenológicas, vol. Monográfico 4/II (2013): Razón y Vida. 415 
 
manently in the horizon of my life, and I am likewise in the horizon of his life. 
Self-forgetfulness extends to the totality of the horizons of the other so that 
these horizons become my total horizon. It is because the horizon of love 
reaches the totality of my life that it has an infinite character: “This relation is 
also,” Husserl adds, “an individual value-relation, just as in general love in a 
genuine sense is a being given away to the other in feeling, valuing, and striv-
ing, a being given away that has in the total being of the other as an other ego 
its horizon of love, an infinite horizon”33. Infinitude is tied to the idea of a pos-
sible maximum and an absolute character: “This love is infinite,” Husserl goes 
on to say, “it is absolute and universal, it is of such a kind that I cannot think 
about something that I could love more, namely, in the sense that, for its sake, 
I could abandon the loved”34. Thus, a second mode of empathy must be distin-
guished, which has nothing to do with objectivation and amounts to an assimi-
lation to alterity that disregards one’s own life, brings one’s own motivation to 
nothing, and adopts the other’s goals. As Husserl puts it: “Empathy admits in 
general a twofold manner: to have the other face to face, to understand him as 
an other, but to have him objectively; and to live, experience, think, feel happy 
jointly with the other, to be assimilated in his being and so eventually to strive 
in his life-striving”35. Self-renunciation extends its reach to the sacrifice of one’s 
own life in a love of neighbor that asserts the absolute value of the other’s life. 
On offering life in sacrifice, Husserl writes: “If he sacrifices his life to the com-
munity, or for a genuine love of neighbor, then he loses his terrestrial life, but 
gains his true life, because in the decision for sacrifice he has accomplished an 
act of life, act which he must love and will absolutely. And all at once he asserts 
the life of humanity as a life that is absolutely demanded, beautiful, and good in 
infinitum”36. Thus Husserl anticipates themes that will be elaborated by Em-
manuel Lévinas and Jan Patočka. 
 
 
33  „Auch diese Beziehung ist eine Individualwertbeziehung, wie denn überhaupt Liebe im echten Sinn 
eine fühlend-wertend und strebend Hingegebensein an den Anderen ist, das in dem ganzen Sein des 
Anderen als einem anderen Ich seinen Horizont der Liebe hat, einen unendlichen Horizont.“ (Ms E III 9, 
33b) 
34 „Diese Liebe ist unendlich, ist absolut und universal, sie ist von einer Art, dass ich nichts denken kann, 
was ich mehr lieben könnte, nämlich in einem Sinn, dass ich um dessentwillen das Geliebte preisgeben 
könnte.“ (Ms E III 4, 15b) 
35  „Einfühlung lässt überhaupt eine doppelte Weise zu, den Anderen gegenüber zu haben, ihn als 
Anderen verstehend, aber objektiv ihn haben und in dem anderen Leben mitleben, miterfahren, 
mitdenken, sich mitfreuen, in seinem Sein aufgehen und somit ev. in seinem Lebensstreben streben.“ 
(Ms E III 9, 34a) 
36 „Opfert er sein Leben der Gemeinschaft, oder aus echter Nächstenliebe, so verliert er sein irdisches 
Leben, aber er gewinnt sein wahres Leben, weil in der Entscheidung für das Opfer ein Lebensakt 
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Love has a relation with the value of persons and involves a call that is 
lived as an absolute ought prior to any axiological comparison. It has nothing to 
do with a calculation of values, i.e., the rational law of absorption of lower by 
higher values: “There is an unconditional ‘you should and must’, which is orien-
tated toward persons, and which, for whom experiences this absolute affection, 
is not subject to an absolute grounding and does not depend from it for its le-
gitimate constriction. This affection has a priority over rational analysis, even 
where this analysis is possible”37. Such a feeling goes before a rational analysis, 
but does not withdraw form the realm of reason because it depends on an “evi-
dence of preference (Evidenz der Bevorzugung)”38. As values of an absolute 
ought, the values of loving another do not admit a comparison that would rela-
tivize them because they bring forth insurmountable demands that enter into a 
conflict. This can lead to a decision with the sacrifice of one of them: “The voice 
of consciousness, the voice of an absolute ought, can demand from me some-
thing that I would never acknowledge in a comparison of values”39. Here Hus-
serl raises an objection to his first formulation of the categorical imperative ac-
cording to which we are obliged to do the best attainable within the sphere of 
our rational influence. In order to acknowledge the claims of a vocation (Beruf) 
or an inner call (Ruf), Husserl restricts the best attainable to the facts or events 
accompanying a decision: “Do your best according to your best knowledge and 
belief (Tue dein Bestes nach bestem Wissen und Gewissen)” (Hua XXXVII, 7)40.     
In contrast to a calculation that compares and weighs objective values and 
falls prey to irrationality when higher values are set aside, the best knowledge 
and belief takes personal values into account and follows an inner call that is 
grounded in the love of neighbor. Following this path we reach “the most com-
 
 
vollzogen ist, den er absolut lieben und wollen muss. Und in eins bejaht er das Leben der Menschheit als 
ein absolut gefordertes, schönes und gutes in infinitum.“ (Ms E III 4, 16 ab) 
37  Ms B I 21, 65a. Quoted by Ullrich Melle, „Einleitung des Herausgebers,“ in Edmund Husserl, 
Vorlesungen über Ethik und Wertlehre 1908-1914, Husserliana XXVIII (Dordrecht/Boston/London: 
Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1988), p. xlviii. 
38 Ms E III 9, 34a. Husserl admits that “it would be ridiculous to make a demand on a mother that she 
should first think over if supporting her child is the best in her practical sphere.” (Ms F I 49, 144a/Hua 
XXVIII, xlvi ) The value of her child is for the mother an absolute value that cannot be understood by an 
impartial onlooker that compares values. Only the mother can live her motherly ought with evidence in 
an originary manner, and only another mother, by virtue of what her child means for her, can under-
stand the first mother.  
39 Ms A V 21, 122ab. Quoted in Hua XXVIII, xlvi s. 
40 Ms B I 21, 65a. Quoted in Hua XXVIII, xlvii. Husserl refers to a life conducted “according to the ‘best 
knowledge and belief,’ namely, the best possible in each case for the particular ethical subject.” (Hua 
XXVII, 40) 
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plete superiority of reason (die vollendeste Herrschaft der Vernunft)”41 in the 
intersubjective realm. The community of love extends to the point in which the 
entire humanity is contemplated as a life-community for which I have a vital 
interest and in whose self-contentment is included the self-contentment of indi-
vidual subjects: “To the categorical imperative of the individual subject pertains 
a striving to the highest form of community […]”42. Just as rationality loses its 
true course when the references of its ideal constructions to the intuitive world 
and the community of sciences is overlooked, it is also laid astray when ethical 
norms lose their reference to ethical consciousness and the community of love.  
The analogy between truth and love is based on a parallel striving within 
the intersubjective horizon for accordance between the plurality of subjects, but 
in the case of truth it is grounded on a balance and adjustment between sub-
jects, whereas in the case of love there is a loss of balance in favor of the oth-
er. With love and sacrifice a first breach is introduce in each center of legitima-
tion because the realm of subjective accordance and their balanced integration 
into intersubjective accordance is overcome.  
A second breach is related to will and concerns irrationality. The surround-
ing world is an open realm of unforeseen events that put obstacles in the way 
of our action. This irrational contingency amounts to a destiny that has to do 
with the foolishness and wickedness of human beings and our dependence on 
the course of nature and our body with its deficiencies, illness, and death. Prac-
tical reason gets disturbed by fortuitous, irrational, and incalculable events, 
which, nevertheless, make up a medium for the development of our freedom 
and hence have the function of conveying dignity and justification to life insofar 
as they urge us to encompass them within a realm of rationality in a process 
that can be characterized, in Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s words, as the establish-
ment of rationality in contingency. In spite of the tension between destiny and 
freedom, the ultimate horizon belongs to reason: “Everything rational has its 
horizons of irrationality. But irrationality is itself a formation of rationality ap-
prehended in a more extended scope […]”43. 
 
 
41 Ms F I 24, 47b.  
42 E. Husserl, „Wert des Lebens,“ p. 219 s. 
43 „Alles Rationale hat seine Horizonte der Irrationalität. Aber die Irrationalität ist selbst eine Gestalt der 
weiter gefassten Rationalität; […].“ (Ms A V 22, 23b) 
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The teleology of reason is submitted to the power of a superior principle 
because a guarantee is required for this development. In a letter to Ernst Cassi-
rer, Husserl refers to “the problems of factualness as such, the problems of ‘ir-
rationality,’ which, in my opinion, can only be treated in an extended method of 
the Kantian postulates.” And he adds: “Maybe this is the greatest of all Kantian 
discoveries”44. Husserl has in mind the disappearance of the culture and its sys-
tems of values due to the possible end of life on the earth. Life shows us that 
nothing is definite and that we are threatened by a universal declination. Thus, 
if the constitution of the world is a contingent and perishable fact that can end 
up in a chaos, human life is affected by a lack of meaning: “But if I believe and 
become conscious of this belief, if I perform it freely out of this practical source, 
it bestows meaning to the world and to my life, it provides the joyful confidence 
that nothing is in vain and that everything is for good.” (Hua VIII, 355) Only 
with the presupposition of this belief, which has no theoretical basis but is 
grounded on motives of rational practical life, my life can “persist in a rational 
manner”45 by attempting to overcome irrationalities helped by the “force of ra-
tional faith (Kraft des verünftigen Glaubens)”46. The categorical imperative is 
now joined to the acceptance of an absolute will in a contact that can be ac-
complished in several levels: “[…] the highest is the pure belief in which the 
individual ego has abandoned himself completely, and wants to do nothing but 
to satisfy God, i.e., to fulfill absolutely God’s call”47. 
We can see, then, that not only my vital horizon depends on the vital hori-
zon of the other but all vital horizons are subject to the guidelines of a universal 
teleology. Two modes of abandonment of the self with a displacement in the 
harmony of one’s own vital horizon set aside self-centeredness in the striving 
for harmony. The displacement is, to be sure, without escape form harmony, 
but the absorption of one’s own vital horizon in the other’s vital horizon and of 
both in teleology becomes the distinctive trait of axiological-practical reason. 
 
 
44 Edmund Husserl, Briefwechsel. V. Die Neukantianer, Husserliana-Dokumente III/5 (Kluwer Academic 
Publishers: Dordrecht/Boston/London, 1994), p. 6. 
45  „Erst unter Voraussetzung dieses Glaubens gewinnt mein Leben Zwecksinn und kann 
vernünftigerweise erhalten bleiben und erhält Schwungkraft und notwendig steigernden Wert.“ (Ms A V 
21, 24b) 
46 Ms A V 21, 128b. 
47 „[…] Die höchste der reine Glaube, in dem das einzelne Ich  sich selbst ganz hingegeben hat und 
nichts anderes will als Gott wohlgefallen, d.i. rein den Gottesruf erfüllen.“ (Ms A V 21, 107 b) 
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These two breaches amount to a breakthrough in the unitary style that must be 
bestowed on the life of every individual subject.  
It is worth dwelling for a moment on a point of contact in Husserl’s presen-
tation of the categorical imperative with Martin Heidegger’s notion of formal 
indication as a methodological moment of phenomenology. In his first Freiburg 
courses, devoted to the search for an originary science of life in which no a pri-
ori eidetic laws would afford an anticipation of their object, Heidegger holds 
that philosophical concepts do not intend directly what they refer to but hand 
over a task of self-transformation. It is because the experience of life is threat-
ened by a tendency to lapse into objectivity that formal indication has a precau-
tionary character intended to keep away this possible deviation. According to 
Heidegger, with regard to phenomena, we can inquire into their content 
(Gehalt), i.e., “what” is experienced, their reference (Bezug), i.e., “how” the 
content is experienced, and their accomplishment (Vollzug), i.e., “how” the ref-
erence is effected. In this totality of meaning, with three directions that must 
be explained by phenomenology, reference and accomplishment are not deter-
mined beforehand but are left undecided (see GA 60, 63 f.). At the same time 
Heidegger stresses that the binding force of formal indication is undetermined 
as regards content but determined as regards accomplishment (see GA 61, 19 
f.)48.  
The question may now be raised whether Husserl shares this standpoint in 
his analysis of the categorical imperative. It should not be overlooked that the 
background of formal indication is to be found in Husserl’s notion of formaliza-
tion and in his distinction, as regards essentially occasional expressions, be-
tween an indicating meaning that keeps open a situational understanding and 
an indicated meaning that fulfills the indetermination49. It has also been argued 
that the three senses enclosed in formal indication refer back to Husserl: con-
tent-sense to the noematic content, referential sense to the quality of an act, 
and actualizing-sense to the distinction between inauthentic or empty and au-
thentic or fulfilled thinking50. Be this as it may, it could also be argued that 
 
 
48 Abbreviation, with an indication of volume and page, for Martin Heidegger, Gesamtausgabe (Frankfurt 
am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1978-2010).  
49 See José Adrián Escudero, Heidegger y la genealogía de la pregunta por el ser (Barcelona: Herder, 
2010), p. 405 ff. 
50 This is advocated by Steven Galt Crowell, Husserl, Heidegger, and the Space of Meaning. Paths toward 
Transcendental Phenomenology (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 2001), p. 142 f. 
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Husserl’s formal presentation of the categorical imperative can be connected 
with the content-sense, that the various formulations―those referred to the 
best attainable, the vital individual horizon, the love of neighbor, and the call of 
God―reflect Heidegger’s referential sense, and that ethical praxis itself is asso-
ciated with the accomplishment-sense. Indication orientated toward actualiza-
tion is present in Husserl, although always with a clearly formulated guiding 
content, i.e., not only with the constriction of an accomplishment but also with 
orientations for the course that must be taken by action. This can be found 
both in the formal and provisional presentation of the categorical imperative 
and in the peculiar character of personal values that demand an actualization or 
accomplishment. Husserl holds that “a categorical imperative with a general 
content (Inhalt) is referred (bezogen) to the whole future life,” (Hua XXXVII, 
247) and adds that “I am not ethical through sheer knowledge but rather by a 
free decision”51. 
 
 
5. A BRIEF EPILOGUE FOR SPANISH SPEAKING PEOPLE 
 
By way of conclusion I will briefly touch upon a controversial contention of 
Ortega y Gasset. The Spanish philosopher holds that Husserlian lived-
experiences (Erlebnisse) have nothing to do with life but rather are opposed to 
it: “The phenomenological attitude is strictly the opposite of the attitude that I 
call ‘vital reason’” (V, 545)52. Furthermore, Ortega recalls that Dilthey remained 
trapped up in the opposition between vital irrationalism and intellectual ration-
alism, and criticizes him for not discovering the rationalism of life (see VI, 196 
n.). In showing that the contrast with Husserl fades away, I wish to suggest 
that Ortega returns in a way to Dilthey.  
We have first examined the instinctive basis of reason. This view is shared 
by Ortega, who characterizes reason as “a correction of instinct, an improve-
ment of spontaneity,” “a mere supplement to a deficient instinct,” and “an addi-
tional instinct that substitutes the lost ones.” (III, 485; VI, 473) In a second 
step, we have considered the upright reason of natural human understanding, 
 
 
51 E. Husserl, „Wert des Lebens“, p. 212.  
52 Reference, with indication of volume and page, to José Ortega y Gasset, Obras Completas (Madrid: 
Revista de Occidente/Alianza Editorial, 1946-1983). 
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and mentioned Husserlian descriptions that show, in Ortega’s words, that “liv-
ing has no alternative than reasoning in view of the inexorable circumstance” 
(VI, 67). We can also remember that Ortega, for whom life is “concern,” urges 
us to “take care”53 of ourselves, and describes reason as emerging out of the 
vicissitudes of life. He also states that the divergence between subjective 
worlds “does not imply the falsehood of one of them” because the reduction of 
the world to horizonality “furnishes it with a vital dimension, locates it in the 
stream of life, […].” (III, 200, 202) The Husserlian transition to second histo-
ricity is exposed by Ortega as the passage from the “absorbed” to the “open.” 
(see IX, 132 ss.) And the analysis of the movement from latent to manifest 
reason evokes Ortega’s statement that “new modes of reason, sometimes with 
features opposite to the codified ones, emerged out of its previous figure, over-
flowing and overcoming it.”54. 
According to Ortega, what is urgently required is that cultural objective im-
peratives be complemented with vital subjective imperatives: “The ethical ide-
al,” he writes, “cannot content itself with being itself extremely correct: it 
should succeed in exciting our impetuousness.” (III, 171) Thus truth must join 
together with sincerity in the realm of thought, beauty with delectation in the 
realm of feeling, and goodness with vehemence in the field of will. The impera-
tive of objectiveness must blend with loyalty to ourselves, i.e., it must incite 
our deep energies. We have seen an expression of this demand in the succes-
sive link of the categorical imperative with the circumstances of life, the re-
quirements of love, and the claims of teleology. 
Regarding truth and sincerity, there are clearly Husserlian themes that go 
through Ortega’s philosophy. An acute depiction of evidence is offered in the 
observation that it “consists in searching if there is in the thing itself about 
which one speaks what is spoken of it, what is said about it”55. Ortega’s conten-
tion that vital reason cannot be substituted by pure reason goes hand in hand 
with the Husserlian reference to the “primal evidence (Urevidenz)” of transcen-
dental life and the lifeworld as the two originary evidences that ground all other 
evidences (see Hua VI, 80, 131) and with the distinction drawn between con-
 
 
53 José Ortega y Gasset, Unas lecciones de metafísica (Madrid: Revista de Occidente, 1974), p. 41. See 
OC IV, 144. 
54 José Ortega y Gasset, Sobre la razón histórica (Madrid: Revista de Occidente/Alianza Editorial, 1980), 
p. 230. 
55 J. Ortega y Gasset, Unas lecciones de metafísica, p. 64. 
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tingent a priori and formal a priori. Formal pure reason, understood as a play of 
thoughts or a calculation of values is certainly for Husserl, put in Ortega’s 
words, “only a small island floating on the sea of a primary vitality.” (III, 177)  
In what concerns feeling, Ortega refers to “the great components of love,” 
(IV, 476) i.e., the perspicacity or intuition that enables us to appreciate vital 
perfection in the intimacy of other human beings, the enchantment by which we 
feel ourselves torn away from our own vital depths and transplanted into the 
depths of the loved person, and the absorption of the lover by the loved. As we 
have seen, each of these moments is present in Husserl’s analyses, whose val-
uation of love as a basic problem of phenomenology has its counterpart in Or-
tega’s question: “Who can estimate the revelations that the study and politics 
of love will grant us?” (II, 27) 
As regards the will, Husserl gives prominence to three factors: a rational 
decision, the irrationality that confronts us as destiny, and our confidence in 
teleology, i.e., “our hope in an actual rationality.” (Hua VI, 343) In turn, Ortega 
highlights “three specific powers of our human destiny,” (IX, 587) i.e., the ca-
pacity of having enthusiasm, the awareness of hazard, and hope. Enthusiasm, 
which Ortega matches with the Greek eros, enables us to project ourselves to 
the future and is connected with the fact that, for a human being, “reason or 
rationality is an inexorable imperative, a call or outcry that is sounded in his 
most deep and genuine intimacy […]”56. But the future is uncertain because it is 
not in our hands and humanity does not always adopt a rational behavior. This 
implies an awareness of hazard, i.e., of the Greek tyché, which is a conscious-
ness of the insecurity or “indocility of the future.” (IX, 588) Thus, our life is full 
of perplexity in the sense of an oscillation between enthusiasm and anxiety (see 
VI, 349 f.).  Finally, the third specific power is hope, or the Greek elpís, con-
ceived as an ultimate confidence that allows us to face insecurity. Ortega holds 
that reason “manages to give an outline of rationality to hazard itself, the de-
mon of the irrational […].” (IX, 392) But he also contends that confidence is so 
irrational as contingencies. 
The difference between Husserl and Ortega lies not in the imperative of ra-
tionality, nor does it lie in the role assigned to contingency. Rather the differ-
ence lies in the nature of confidence or hope. When he considers rationality as 
 
 
56 J. Ortega y Gasset, Sobre la razón histórica, p. 230. 
REASON AND ITS LIVING HORIZONS IN EDMUND HUSSERL’S PHENOMENOLOGY 423 
 
Investigaciones Fenomenológicas, vol. Monográfico 4/II (2013): Razón y Vida. 423 
 
such as a “small island surrounded everywhere by irrationality,” (III, 292; see 
V, 602) Ortega refers to Dilthey’s statement, which I have quoted at the outset 
and which he himself criticizes, about reason being like an island that emerges 
out of unfathomable depths. On Husserl’s account, confidence in reason cannot 
be considered so irrational as contingencies. Even if he calls attention to its 
frontiers, Husserl does not consider rationality as an island at least from a tele-
ological point of view. On the contrary, he asserts that it is not an “accidental 
green spot in the desert of the world”57. Whereas Ortega describes a back-
ground of irrationality as what actually is, Husserl exhibits it as what should not 
be. The permanent and essential perplexity inherent to life has a path to be 
followed, and the responsibility of a philosopher is to encompass irrationality 
within a more extensive rationality. Even if pure reason in the sense of a formal 
a priori is a small island floating on the sea of primal vitality, reason as such is 
not for Husserl an island surrounded everywhere by irrationality. 
 
 
 
57 E. Husserl, “Wert des Lebens”, p. 215. 
